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perceive their investments in the pension scheme as a substitute for direct investments, and whether
allocating more equities in their pension accounts induces participants to reduce or increase their
directly-held equity investments. The results show that investors do not perceive direct investment in the
equity market as a close substitute for their retirement accounts, suggesting that an individual account
system does not crowd out direct equity market investment. Accordingly, the new Swedish system may
actually help educate investors of the benefits of stock market participation, increasing participation and
therefore, indirectly, boosting saving.
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Chapter 12
Pension Portfolio Choice and
Menu Exposure
Anders Karlsson, Massimo Massa, and Andrei Simonov

This chapter examines how the introduction of a funded defined contribution (DC) retirement system affects participants’ propensity to participate
in the stock market. This is an interesting topic in view of the transition to
funded individual account plans in many nations around the world. Here
we focus on what we call the ‘Swedish experiment;’ in the year 2000, the
traditional Swedish pay-as-you-go retirement system was partially replaced
by a national DC plan commonly referred to as the premium pension
(PPM) system (Sunden 2000). Our main question is whether individuals perceive their investments in the pension scheme as a substitute for
direct investments, and whether allocating more equities in their pension
accounts induces participants to reduce or increase their directly held
equity investments.
Standard portfolio choice theory suggests that investors would choose
an optimal overall market exposure taking into account both direct and
indirect (e.g. through a pension scheme) investment in equity. That is,
pension and nonpension equity holdings would be seen as substitutes,
at least to a first order. By contrast, behavioral finance theorists instead
hypothesize that investors tend to categorize their investments, along with
associated gains and losses, according to narrow categories. This approach,
labeled ‘mental accounting’ or ‘narrow framing’, predicts that investors
apply such mental accounting to stock holdings and react separately to
gains and losses for different stocks (Barberis and Huang 2001).
The implications of the two theories are starkly different. Standard
portfolio theory would posit that inducing investors to hold their retirement accounts in pension funds would crowd out direct equity investment.
Behavioral theory, instead, suggests that if investors perceive their investment in pension funds and equity to be different sorts of accounts, one
investment would not necessarily crowd out the other. The best way to
examine this issue is to see whether introducing a DC individual account
system changes investor incentives to directly participate in the stock market. To do a proper analysis, we would require information on investors’
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portfolio choices before the change, and to explore what happened after
the introduction of the new pension system. Until now, this sort of information has been unavailable.
Our contribution is to exploit data on a large and representative sample
of Swedish individuals tracked over time. Not only do we have information
on their wealth, income, tax position, and demographic characteristics, but
also we have semiannual information on the value of each investor’s stock
positions as well as the daily value of his transactions in the PPM system. In
particular, the data-set on the individual retirement accounts includes all
individual choices made from the introduction of the system until October
2004. We use the evidence provided on investors’ patterns in the PPM
system to test whether having a pension account containing mutual fund
investments changes investor incentives to participate directly in the stock
market.
The results show that investors do not perceive direct investment in the
equity market as a close substitute for their retirement accounts, suggesting
that an individual account system does not crowd out direct equity market
investment. The new Swedish system may actually help educate investors
of the benefits of stock market participation, increasing participation and
therefore, indirectly, boosting saving. In what follows, we first describe the
Swedish experiment and provide institutional details. Next, we describe the
data and our main evidence. A short conclusion offers policy implications.

The Swedish ‘Experiment’
The Swedish government made changes to its old pay-as-you-go national
retirement program in the fall of 2000. The ‘basic’ portion of the system is
a guaranteed benefit designed to ensure that no retiree will be completely
without benefits in retirement, regardless of her or his previous income.
There are two earnings-related elements of the new pension system, one
being the Notional Defined Contribution (NDC) plan, financed by a tax
of 16 percent of annual pay; revenue from this system is used to finance
current retirees, and the amount paid in also serves as a base in calculating
future pension payments. The second earnings-related component, of most
interest here, is the premium pension (PPM) portion. This is financed
by a mandated contribution 2.5 percent of annual pay, which is invested
according to each individual’s discretion. At inception, each participant
was mailed a prospectus describing the investment menu of 464 funds, from
which the participant had to elect from 1 to 5 of these choices.
Table 12-1 represents the information provided to investors in the PPM
system. In addition to the fund identification number, name, and fund
family, information is provided on fees, past return, and risk. Risk is

Baring Global
Emerging
Markets; Baring
International
Fund Managers
(Ireland) Ltd

191080
Emerging market
equity and
equity related
assets

Information
Regarding
Fund

1.59

Fund Fee
(%/yr)
1996
10

1995
−32
25

1997

In the Year

−25

1998
77

1999

25.3

Last
5 yrs

Percentage Return 99-12-31 (After Fees)

32 (Red)

Last
3 yrs

Total Risk

Source: Premiepensionsmyndigheten (2000).
Notes: The percentage return for the last five years equals the compounded annual growth rate of return for the years 1995 through 1999. The total
risk corresponds to an annualized percentage standard deviation of three-year monthly historical fund returns. The total risk is also categorized
into five different classes, and colors, with respect to standard deviation; Class 1: very low risk, dark green, and percentage standard deviation in
the range 0–2; Class 2: low risk, light green, and 3–7; Class 3: average risk, yellow, and 8–17; Class 4: high risk, orange, and 18–24; Class 5: very high
risk, red, and 25+.

Fund Name and
Management
Company

Fund Number

Table 12-1 Extract from the PPM Investor Information Folder, for a Specific Fund Example
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represented by a simplified graph displaying a jagged red line for very risky
or a flat green line for very low risk. There are five risk categories of this
kind. In addition, each fund has a number representing the fund’s annualized standard deviation over the past thirty-six months. If, for some reason,
no menu choice is actively elected, the participant’s money is invested in
the default which is the Seventh Swedish Pension Fund; this is an equity
fund run by the government. The accrued amount from the PPM part will
be paid out on a monthly basis to the individual at the time of retirement.
In total, 18.5 percent of the annual pension-based income for each
individual is invested to finance this system, and all annual income from the
age of 16 is included. Yet there is a contribution crediting limit: individuals
who earn more than 7.5 income ‘base amounts’1 per year are only credited
with 18.5 percent of 7.5 income base amounts, even though they still pay
the contribution on their entire pension-based income.2 The first pension
investments in the PPM system, in October 2000, involved 4.4 million
individuals. At that time, workers’ initial contribution was set at 2 percent
of pay for 1997–8 and 2.5 percent for 1999 and 2000. The average amount
invested was 12,651 SEK for the entire population and 13,506 SEK for
those who made an active investment election;3 the maximum invested was
26,202 SEK.
When the PPM system was introduced, the government and the mutual
fund industry launched a massive advertising campaign (Cronqvist and
Thaler 2004; Cronqvist 2006). Though low on information content (level
of fees, risks, etc.), the ads did help create a positive image of investing
in financial markets. More than 86 percent of all investors were exposed
to TV ads, 75 percent were exposed to some advertising in print media,
59 percent saw some kind of outdoor ads, and 36 percent listened to
radio ads (Cronqvist 2006). Accordingly, virtually the entire population was
exposed to information about investing in financial markets at the time of
the PPM launch.
Figure 12-1 shows how the Swedish stock market peaked in March 2000
showing a 15-month gain of 141 percent (January 1999–March 2000). In
the second half of 2000 (when the PPM was introduced), the market fell
20 percent, and it then continued to fall for the first 6 months of 2001,
dropping about 15 percent further.
About 6 percent of our sample population was invested directly in the
stock market in June 30, 1999. This figure increased to 8.5 percent by
June 2000 and further to 9 percent by the end of 2000 and 9.35 percent by June 2001. Thus, our three dates after this extreme bull market
show an increase in stock market participation. This increased interest for
the stock market could be a delayed reaction of the 1999 bull market.
But it is also possible that rising interest in the stock market despite the
bear market of 2000–1 can be attributed to the substantial marketing
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Figure 12-1. Swedish stock market index. (Source: Ibbotson Associates (MSCISweden Sweden Total Return Index, data ID IBOR002028 in SEK January 1999 =
100).)

campaigns in 2000 encouraging individuals to make an active choice in
PPM.

The Data
To analyze investment choices under the PPM model, we have collected
data from three different sources: investment allocations in the PPM system, investor stock market holdings’ and investor demographics. Our
sample is a representative cross section of the Swedish workforce, whose
PPM investment choices have been linked to individual demographic data
collected by Statistics Sweden for the year 2000. This linked data-set makes
it possible to study investment behavior in great detail.

Asset Allocation Information
Data on individual retirement accounts are collected from PPM, and they
indicate all individual choices made from the introduction of the system
until October 2004. Both the transaction date and clearing date are known.
We also know the universe of funds that was available to investors at
each point in time. Thus, for each individual, there is information on the
amount invested in each fund, and in which funds the individual invested.
Approximately two-thirds of the 4.4 million participants in PPM made an
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active investment decision. For these individuals, we can investigate the
exact allocation of assets in their portfolios. The remaining third did not
make an active investment decision, so their money was defaulted into the
government-run equity fund.

Portfolio Data
For each investor, we have detailed information about individual stockholdings, mutual funds, bank accounts, real estate, and other types of wealth
for the period 1995–2000. The Security Register Center (VPC or Vardepapperscentralen) have data on both stocks held directly and in a street
name, including holdings of US-listed ADRs. In addition, SIS Ägarservice
AB collects information on the ultimate owners of shares held via trusts,
foreign holding companies, and the like (cf. Sundin and Sundquist 2002).
Overall, the records provide information about the owners of 98 percent
of the market capitalization of publicly traded Swedish companies. For the
median company, we have information about 97.9 percent of the equity,
and in the worst case, 81.6 percent of market capitalization of the company.
The data provided by SIS Ägarservice AB are linked by Statistics Sweden to
the demographic data described below.

Additional Data
We also use data on demographic statistics reported by Statistics Sweden,
the Swedish version of the US Census Bureau. Data sources include HEK
2000 (a report on household economics), IoF 2000 (a report on individual
and household measures of income), and SUN 2000 (a report on educational status). These three reports represent a cross section of the Swedish
population and contain detailed information including the amount of foreign assets held per person by asset class. The data also describe individuals’
demographic status in 2000, at the time the initial PPM choice was made.
We also have information on the investor’s age as of December 31, 2000,
whether the investor is an immigrant, his income, and net wealth,4 if the
investor lives in an urban or rural area or small town, the investor’s education level and major, his occupation, sex, and marital status. Excluding
individuals too young or too old to make a selection in the PPM system
in 2000, the sample includes 15,651 individuals, of whom 10,373 made an
active choice.
Preliminary descriptive statistics appear in Table 12-2, where we note that
the average investor holds 2.60 funds (conditional on making an active
choice, 3.47 funds). Men hold slightly fewer funds than women; though
the difference is statistically significant, the economic magnitude is only

Table 12-2 Descriptive Statistics for PPM Investors
Mean
ENTERSIM
ENTERAFTER
EXITSIM
EXITAFTER
Choice
Equity
Number of funds
Age
Swede
Income
Net wealth
Urban
Town
Rural
Education: less then high school
Education: high school
Education: college
Major: social science
Major: engineering
Major: medical
Major: other
Occ: public sector
Occ: private sector
Occ: self-employed
Occ: other
Male
Married

0.010
0.012
0.053
0.086
0.669
0.901
2.602
43.028
0.887
202,269
444,108
0.354
0.356
0.289
0.181
0.513
0.306
0.262
0.239
0.134
0.365
0.287
0.558
0.048
0.108
0.509
0.778

Std. Dev.
0.010
0.012
0.057
0.079
0.221
0.170
1.409
11.111
0.316
188,121
3,174,320
0.478
0.479
0.454
0.385
0.500
0.461
0.440
0.426
0.341
0.482
0.452
0.500
0.213
0.310
0.500
0.415

Source: Authors’ calculations.
Notes: N = 15,497. Key outcomes are ENTERSIM if between July 2000 and December 2000;
ENTERAFTER takes the value of 1 if a person entered the stock market between January
2001 and June 2001; both are set to 0 otherwise. EXITSIM (EXITAFTER) equals 1 if person
exited the stock market between July 2000 and December 2000 (January 2001 and June
2001) and 0 otherwise. CHOICE is set to 1 if investor made an active choice in the PPM
system, 0 otherwise; Equity represents the amount invested in equity divided by the total
amount held in the PPM. Number of funds represents the number of funds included in the
participant’s PPM portfolio. Age refers to the participant’s age as of December 31, 2000;
Sweden is set to 1 if the individual was born in Sweden, 0 else; INCOME is the individual’s
net income in 2000; NET WEALTH is the individual’s net wealth, which is the market value
of financial wealth + real estate − debt; Urban, Town, and Rural are set to 1 respectively
if the individual lived in one of the three major cities in Sweden, any smaller town, or
on the countyside, correspondingly; education level is split into three dummies set to 1 if
the person’s schooling was less than, equal to, or more than high school, correspondingly;
Education major is split into four dummies set to 1 if person’s higher education major was
social science, engineering, medical, or other; occupation is split into four dummies set to
1 if the person was employed in the public sector, private sector, self employed, or unknown
employment/unemployed; Male is set to 1 if the person was male; and Married is set to 1 if
the person was married.
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about 0.02. Younger investors (under age 40) hold more funds than
older persons (3.27 and 3.71 respectively). Note that while portfolios of
older investors are less exposed to equity and less risky. Older investors
hold 80 percent of their portfolios in equity versus 86 percent for young
investors. Turning to transactions, investors on average rebalance their
portfolios 1.64 times over our time period (with the median of 1, a 99th
percentile of 8 and a maximum of 155). This frequency is lower for men
(women rebalance 1.59 times per year, while the men did so 1.70 times per
year).5

Investment Patterns in the PPM System
In what follows, we first analyze how investors choose the funds in their
retirement account. Some investors choose specific combinations of equity
and bond funds. We call them active investors. Others do not make a
deliberate choice but instead opt for the default government-run equity
fund. Next, we focus on stock market participation to test the link between
the choice in the PPM system and stock market participation. We show
that for the case of the active investors being active in their retirement
choice increases the probability of stock market participation. That is, an
individual who did not participate in the stock market is more likely to enter
it once he has been presented with the new pension scheme. This effect is
not only statistically significant but also economically relevant.

Choice of Funds
The key question of interest is whether PPM participation affects stock market participation. We first approach this by providing descriptive statistics
about how investors select their funds in the PPM system. Some investors
make a deliberate choice and choose specific combinations of equity and
bond funds, while others just opt for the default. This allows us to define
active and passive investors.
Table 12-3 describes entry and exit rates, defined as ratio of people who
entered or exited the stock market between two different periods. Our
focus is on two periods: simultaneous with the rollout of the PPM system
(January 7, 2000–December 31, 2000) and after the PPM system was in
place (January 1, 2001–June 30, 2001). Panel A compares people who
actively choose funds in the PPM system to those who did not, whereas
more than 66 percent of the households made a deliberate decision. These
households were younger, in general. If we concentrate on ENTERSIM,
one can see that entry rate is almost two times larger (1.25% vs. 0.65%)
among the people who made active choice. This difference is also statistically significant ( p-value of both t-test and Wilcoxon test is 0.0009). Similar
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Table 12-3 Entry and Exit Rates as Function of PPM Investment Choice
ENTERSIM
N

Mean

ENTERAFTER
N

Mean

EXITSIM
N

Mean

EXITAFTER
N

Mean

Panel A: Entry and Exit Rates as Function of Active Choice
Choice
0 (No choice)
4,792 0.0065 4,783 0.0084 332
1 (Active choice) 9,378 0.0125 9,314 0.0135 995

0.0663 341
0.0533 1,059

0.1114
0.0784

Test of the difference
t-statistic
p-value
Wilcoxon’ Z
p-value

0.8877
0.3748
0.8881
0.3747

1.8907
0.0589
1.8890
0.0589

−3.3285
0.0009
−3.3266
0.0009

−2.6921
0.0071
−2.6919
0.0071

Panel B: Entry and Exit Rates as Function of Number of Funds Chosen
Number of funds
1
6,140 0.0085 6,119 0.0083 490 0.0633
2
1,272 0.0071 1,266 0.0150 120 0.0250
3
1,997 0.0080 1,993 0.0085 212 0.0566
4
1,872 0.0107 1,865 0.0123 173 0.0751
5
2,889 0.0177 2,854 0.0196 332 0.0482
Test of the difference between groups 1 and 5
t-statistic
−3.8360
−4.5921
p-value
0.0001
0.0000
Wilcoxon’ Z
−3.8330
−4.5870
p-value
0.0001
0.0000

511
126
216
180
367

0.0978
0.0556
0.1157
0.0611
0.0763

0.9126
0.3617
0.9130
0.3614

1.1067
0.2687
1.1070
0.2685

Test of the difference between groups 1 and combined 2, 3, 4, and 5
t-statistic
−2.0229
−3.3178
−0.8139
p-value
0.0431
0.0009
0.4158
Wilcoxon’ Z
−2.0229
−3.3170
−0.8140
p-value
0.0431
0.0009
0.4156

−1.1525
0.2493
−1.1530
0.2492

This table reports entry and exit rates for subgroups of people who actively selected funds in
the PPM system, and the ones who did not (Panel A); and subgroups of people who choose
different number of funds (Panel B).
Source: Authors’ calculations.
Note: For variable definitions, see Table 12-2.

results were obtained for period after introduction of PPM system (January
2001–June 2001). People who made active choice 61 percent more likely
to enter stock market during this period (1.35% vs. 0.84%, p-value of
mean and median test is 0.0071). At the same time, active participation
in PPM system does not affect exit rate strongly. Panel B divides the sample
into subgroups of investors who choose different numbers of funds. As in
Panel A, people who choose multiple funds are more likely than people
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who choose only one fund to enter the stock market and same chances to
exit.

Pension Choice and Stock Market Participation
We next focus on the link between PPM system choice and stock market
participation. We focus both on investors who did participate in the stock
market and look at their exit rates, and also those who did not participate
initially and evaluate their later entry rates. These we model as a function
of investors’ demographic characteristics and choices made in the PPM
system. The sample is affected by selection bias inasmuch as people with
certain demographic characteristics are more likely to invest in the stock
market. To deal with this issue, we estimate a two-stage Heckman-type
probit selection model for the decision to enter the stock market (cf. van
de Ven and van Praag 1981). That is, we first estimate the probability that
the investor holds equity already at time t − 1, and then, conditional on
that behavior, we relate it to the decision to enter the stock market. For
example, for investor j with characteristics x j , z j we estimate the following
equation:
Entry j = (x j ‚ + u1 j > 0).
The selection equation is z j „ + u2 j > 0, where u1 ∼ N(0, 1), u2 ∼ N(0, 1)
and corr(u1 , u2 ) = Ò. Choice in the pension scheme is posited to depend
on a number of investor demographic characteristics, income, wealth, residential location, and education.6
The dependent variables of most interest are indicators of individuals
exiting or entering the stock market during this period, and a continuous
variable for how much the individual investor has increased or decreased
her investments. In particular, ENTERSIM takes the value of 1 if the
investor entered the stock market simultaneous with the PPM launch (July
1, 2000–December 31, 2000), while ENTERAFTER takes the value of 1 if
the person entered the stock market after the launch (January 1, 2000–
June 30, 2001). Similarly, EXITSIM (EXITAFTER) takes the value of 1 if
the person exited the stock market between July 1, 2000 and December 31,
2000 (or January 1, 2001–June 30, 2001).
The behavioral variables on which we focus most are choice, equity, and
number of funds. We refer to these as proxies for activity in the PPM system.
Choice takes on a value of 1 if the investor made an active choice in the PPM
system, and equals 0 otherwise. Equity represents the fraction invested in
equity out of the total amount invested in PPM. Number of funds refers
to the number of funds included in the investor’s PPM portfolio. Also
included are other demographic factors defined as above.
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Table 12-4 illustrates one specification for the period during the introduction of PPM system (July 2000–December 2000) and a second after
the introduction of the PPM system (January 2001–June 2001). We start by
considering the decision to enter the stock market, and we provide results
for models with and without a Past Stock Market Participation Dummy
(set equal to one if investor held equity in December 1998, June 1999, or
December 1999). The results confirm that those who made a deliberate
choice under the PPM system have a higher probability of stock market
participation. In particular, there is always a positive relationship between
our three proxies for activity in the PPM system, namely Choice, Equity,
and Number of funds, and the ensuing decision to enter the stock market.
This result is robust, holding for all specifications and cases presented.
Not only is it statistically significant but also economically relevant; thus
making a deliberate choice under the PPM increases the probability of
stock market participation by 0.28 percent (see bold value in row one,
column five). This is equivalent to a 24 percent increase with respect to
the unconditional mean. Analogously, a one standard deviation rise in the
number of funds that the investor selects for his retirement portfolio raises
the probability of stock market entry by 0.12 percent (bold value in row
two, column 11). This represents a 10 percent increase with respect to
the unconditional mean. Finally, an increase in the fraction invested in
equity funds by one standard deviation increases the probability of stock
market entry by 0.4 percent. This represents a 34 percent increase with
respect to the unconditional mean. These results hold for both after the
introduction of PPM system (January 2001–June 2001) and also during the
PPM introduction (July 2000–December 2000; and point estimates in this
earlier period are somewhat larger).
We now consider the decision to exit the market with estimates appearing
in Table 12-5. Here, results indicate that making a deliberate choice under
the PPM system is either irrelevant to the investor’s exit decision, or it
reduces the probability of leaving the stock market (after the introduction
of PPM system). The results for the period of July 2000–December 2000
(Panel A) show that our three proxies for activity in the PPM system do
not affect the exit decision at this point. In Panel B, after the introduction
of PPM (January 2001–June 2001), there is always a negative relationship
between our three proxies for activity in the PPM system and the probability
of leaving the stock market. This result holds across all the different specifications. The results are strongly statistically significant, but the economic
significance is modest. In particular, making a deliberate choice in the
retirement account reduces the probability of leaving the stock market
by 0.22 percent, or 2.8 percent of unconditional mean. Analogously, an
increase in the number of funds that the investor selects for his retirement
portfolio by one standard deviation decreases the probability of leaving the

ME
Est.

t-stat ME
Est.

t-stat ME
Est.

t-stat ME
Est.

t-stat
ME
Est.

t-stat ME

Source: Authors’ calculations.
Notes: All controls from Table 12-2 and an intercept are also included in the model.

This table reports the results of two-stage Heckman-type Probit selection models for the decision to enter the stock market during the introduction of
PPM system (July 2000–December 2000, reported in Panel A) versus after the introduction of PPM system (January 2001–June 2001, reported in Panel
B). We report the result for two specifications with and without Past Participation Dummy (which is equal to 1 if the person held equity in our sample in
December 1998, June 1999, or December 1999. Other control variables are described in Table 12-2. Marginal effects (ME) are given for the second stage;
t-statistics are reported in parentheses.

Panel B: Decision to Enter the Stock Market: January 2001–July 2001
Decision to participate in the stock market (ENTERAFTER)
Choice
0.127 (2.51) 0.0028 0.1253 (2.79) 0.0028
Number of funds
0.0570 (3.81) 0.0012 0.0533 (3.99) 0.0012
Equity
0.1810 (2.39) 0.0039 0.1732 (2.55) 0.0040
Past Participation 0.604 (4.36) 0.0327
0.6494 (4.70) 0.0332
0.6786 (4.63) 0.0339
Dummy
Pseudo R2
0.103
0.096
0.107
0.100
0.104
0.098

Panel A: Decision to Enter the Stock Market: July 2000–December 2000
Decision to participate in the stock market (ENTERSIM)
Choice
0.212 (4.25) 0.0038 0.201 (3.84) 0.0039
Number of funds
0.056 (5.60) 0.0011 0.053 (4.80) 0.0011
Equity
0.286 (4.98) 0.0054 0.279 (4.67) 0.0055
Past Participation 1.083 (10.08) 0.0763
1.094 (10.16) 0.0755
1.100 (9.96) 0.0773
Dummy
Pseudo R2
0.094
0.072
0.094
0.072
0.097
0.076

Est. t-stat

Table 12-4 Effect of PPM Choice on Entry Decision

t-stat
ME
Est.

t-stat
ME
Est.

t-stat
Est.

t-stat

0.086

0.052

Est.

0.113
0.400

0.0000

ME

0.0033

0.0000 −0.004 (−0.09)

ME

(1.21)
(5.48)

t-stat

−0.0031
−0.0007

0.0007911
0.0039884

ME

(1.43)

t-stat

0.0011

ME

0.051

−0.315 (−3.79) −0.0030

0.053

0.104

Est.

This table reports the results of two-stage Heckman-type Probit selection models for the decision to exit the stock market during the introduction of PPM
system (July 2000–December 2000, reported in Panel A) and after the introduction of PPM system (January 2001–June 2001, reported in Panel B). We report
the results for two specifications with and without Past Participation Dummy which is equal to 1 if the person held equity in sample in December 1998, June
1999, and December 1999. Other control variables are our described in Table 12-2. We report marginal effects (ME); t-statistics are reported in parentheses.
Source: Authors’ calculations.
Notes: All controls from Table 12-2 and an intercept are also included in the model.

Panel B: Decision to Exit the Stock Market: January–July 2001
Decision to participate in the stock market (EXITAFTER)
Choice
−0.215 (−3.19) −0.0022 −0.215 (−3.18) −0.0021
Number of funds
−0.068 (−2.05) −0.0007 −0.069 (−2.09) −0.0006
Equity
−0.315 (−3.74)
−0.075 (−0.84)
Past Participation
−0.064 (−0.69) −0.0006
−0.075 (−0.85) −0.0007
Dummy
Pseudo R2
0.047
0.046
0.048
0.047
0.052

Panel A: Decision to Exit the Stock Market: July–December 2000
Decision to participate in the stock market (EXITSIM)
Choice
−0.030 (−0.40) −0.0002 −0.052 (−0.55) −0.0005
Number of funds
−0.009 (−0.23)
Equity
Past Participation
0.427 (6.24) 0.0033
0.427 (5.97)
Dummy
Pseudo R2
0.086
0.053
0.085

Est.

Table 12-5 Effect of PPM Choice on Exit Decision
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stock market by 0.07 percent (about 0.8% of unconditional mean). Finally,
an increase in the fraction invested in equity funds by one standard deviation reduces the probability of leaving the stock market by 0.31 percent.
This represents a 3.9 percent decrease with respect to the unconditional
mean.7
Overall, then, the findings suggest a sort of ‘learning effect’. That is
investors afforded the choice to invest their retirement money in equity
funds and then make a deliberate choice to do so, are more likely to enter
the stock market.

Pension Choice and Stock Market Participation:
Controlling for Endogeneity.
Next we consider the issue of endogeneity which arises because the investor
determines the value for his Choice, Equity, and Number of Funds variables
jointly with the decision to participate in the stock market. To correct
for this, we adopt an Instrumental Variables (IV) methodology. Specifically, we estimate both a two-Stage Least Squares (2SLS) linear probability model and an IV-Probit model of the decision to enter the stock
market, as a function of our three proxies for activity in the PPM system as well as the other controls. We use as instruments Age and Age
squared.
Our estimates appear in Tables 12-6 and 12-7, where the explanatory
variable in Panel A is the active choice decision under the PPM system;
in Panel B, it is the number of funds chosen; and in Panel C, it is the
fraction of equity in the chosen portfolio. As in the previous case, we
estimate a specification for the period during the introduction of PPM
system (July 2000–December 2000) and after the introduction of the PPM
system (January 2001–June 2001).
As before, there is a positive relationship between the three proxies for
PPM activity and the ensuing decision to enter the stock market. Furthermore, this result holds across all specifications and is economically significant. For example, an increase in the probability of making a deliberate
choice in the retirement account triples the unconditional probability of
stock market entry. Marginal effect related to making active choice is about
3 percent, which is three times unconditional probability of entry. Similar
numbers for the effect of choosing multiple funds and choosing larger
fraction of equity are 35 percent and 170 percent increase with respect
to unconditional probability of entry, correspondingly. These results hold
for both the period during the introduction of PPM system (July 2000–
December 2000) and afterward as well (January 2001–June 2001).8

t-stat
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t-stat

2SLS
Est.

t-stat

Probit
ME
Est.

t-stat

First Stage
Est.

t-stat

2SLS
Est.

t-stat

Probit

Entry Jan–June 2001 (ENTERAFTER)

ME

p-val
0.000

Hansen J p-val
0.2164
1.528

˜2
8.300
p-val
0.004

F-stat.
29.78

p-val
0.000

Hansen J p-val
0.161
0.688

F-stat.
213.78

p-val
0.000

Hansen J p-val
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0.711
6.410

˜2

p-val
0.011

F-stat.
211.75

p-val
0.000
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(3.49)
(2.27)

p-val
0.000
0.0062
0.0373

p-val
0.011

Wald Exogeneity Test

0.2590
0.6906

˜2
22.020

Hansen J p-val
0.015
0.9033 6.470

Panel B: Decision to Enter the Stock Market and Number of Funds Chosen in PPM System
0.0048
Number of funds
(1.77) 0.1806 (3.49) 0.0038
0.0066 (1.94)
Past Participation
0.0363 (0.31) 0.1265 (11.89) 1.0777 (7.76) 0.0795 0.0893
(0.59) 0.0687 (5.62)
Dummy
F-test of instruments Hansen OIR Test
F-test of instruments Hansen OIR Test
Wald Exogeneity Test

F-stat.
31.52

Panel A: Decision to Enter Stock Market and Make Active Choice in PPM System
0.0337
Choice
(1.91) 1.1501 (4.09) 0.0316
0.0576
(1.96) 1.6570 (7.24) 0.1149
Past Participation
0.0333 (0.71) 0.1256 (11.66) 0.9555 (4.89) 0.0878 0.0413
(5.32) 0.4576 (2.41) 0.0577
(0.58) 0.0669
Dummy
F-test of instruments Hansen OIR Test
F-test of instruments Hansen OIR Test
Wald Exogeneity Test
Wald Exogeneity Test

Est.

First Stage

Entry June–Dec 2001 (ENTERSIM)

Table 12-6 Effect of PPM Choice on Entry Decision: IV Estimates

p-val
0.000

Hansen J p-val
0.503
0.478

˜2
8.230
p-val
0.004

F-stat.
152.56

p-val
0.000

0.0317
0.0382

˜2
Hansen J p-val
0.7253 13.270
0.122

p-val
0.000

Wald Exogeneity Test

1.0972 (4.35)
0.6407 (2.32)

Notes: All controls from Table 12-2 and an intercept are also included in the model.

This table reports the result of 2SLS linear probability model and IV-Probit estimates of a decision to enter the stock market as a function of active choice
decision (Panel A), number of funds chosen (Panel B), and fraction of equity in the chosen portfolio (Panel C). We used as instruments Age and squared
Age of the investor. We report the results of first stage estimate and joint F-test of significance of the instruments. For 2SLS linear probability model, we
report Hansen over identifying restrictions test. For IV-probit estimates, we report Wald test of exogeneity. We report marginal effects (ME) for probit
estimates; t-statistics are reported in parentheses.
Source: Authors’ calculations.

F-stat.
155.78

Panel C: Decision to Enter the Stock Market and Fraction of Equity Chosen in PPM System
0.0270 (1.99)
0.0211
Equity
(1.79) 0.8268 (4.11) 0.0179
Past Participation
0.0393 (0.88) 0.1259 (11.80) 1.0442 (7.09) 0.0765
0.0429 (0.64) 0.0680 (2.10)
Dummy
F-test of instruments Hansen OIR Test
F-test of instruments Hansen OIR Test
Wald Exogeneity Test
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Hansen OIR Test

2.2024 (2.88)
0.1701 (2.76)
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(1.31)
(3.15)
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−0.0061 (−0.91)

(1.47)

0.0396
0.0465
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Est.

t-stat

Probit
ME
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0.170
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0.169
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−0.0243 (−1.05) −0.1462 (−1.98) −0.0199
−0.0062 (−0.39) −0.0463 (−0.51) −0.0063

2.96
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Hansen OIR Test

−0.0835 (−0.29) −0.7281 (−0.59) −0.1334
−0.0114 (−0.73) −0.0719 (−0.83) −0.0101
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25.480

F-stat.
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1.911

1.669
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5.320
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0.021
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F-test of instruments Hansen OIR Test Wald Exogeneity Test

(3.02) 0.0607
(3.56) 0.0564 0.0590

F-test of instruments Hansen OIR Test Wald Exogeneity Test

Number of funds
Past
0.0542
Participation
Dummy

(−1.22)

F-test of instruments

Panel B: Decision to Exit the Stock Market and Number of Funds Chosen in PPM System

Choice
Past
Participation
Dummy
0.4726
0.0578 −0.0082

t-stat

Est.

t-stat
ME

First Stage

Exit Jan–June 2001 (EXITAFTER)
Probit

Panel A: Decision to Exit the Stock Market and Active Choice in PPM System

Est.

First Stage

Exit June–Dec 2000 (EXITSIM)

Table 12-7 Effect of PPM Choice on Exit Decision: IV Estimates

0.2415
0.0517
(1.77)
(3.57)

1.9007 (5.46)
0.2976 (3.57)

p-val
0.000

F-stat.

9.350
0.431

0.511

Hansen J p-val
18.350

˜2

(−1.90)

−0.1114 (−0.76) −0.6713 (−1.74) −0.0915
−0.0109 (−0.70) −0.0687 (−0.76) −0.0093

p-val
0.000

F-stat.
9.380

p-val
0.000
1.900
0.168

Hansen J p-val

p-val
0.294

˜2
1.100

F-test of instruments Hansen OIR Test Wald Exogeneity Test

0.4385
0.0715 −0.0131

F-test of instruments Hansen OIR Test Wald Exogeneity Test

−0.0107 (−1.29)

Source: Authors’ calculations.
Notes: All controls from Table 12-2 and an intercept are also included in the model.

This table reports the result of 2SLS linear probability model and IV-probit estimates of a decision to exit the stock market as a function of active choice
decision (Panel A), number of funds chosen (Panel B), and fraction of equity in the chosen portfolio (Panel C). We used as instruments Age and squared
Age of the investor. We report the results of first stage estimate and joint F -test of significance of the instruments. For 2SLS linear probability model, we
report Hansen over identifying restrictions test. For IV-probit estimates, we report Wald test of exogeneity. We report marginal effects (ME) for Probit
estimates, and t-statistics are reported in parentheses.

Equity
Past
Participation
Dummy

Panel C: Decision to Exit the Stock Market and Fraction of Equity Chosen in PPM System
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We now consider the decision to exit the market. When endogeneity
is properly controlled, it is interesting that the results for the period July
2000–December 2000 now show a strong positive impact of our proxies for
activity in PPM on the decision to exit the stock market. It is consistent
with some participants in the stock market (probably bubble era entries)
being induced by the PPM publicity campaigns to review stock market
risks (or perhaps they simply looked at their holdings which dropped 20%
in value during that period) and decided to leave. The decision to leave
the stock market after the introduction of the PPM system proves to be
unrelated to the PPM behavior. Results in Table 12-7 are weaker than those
reported in Table 12-5; further the 2SLS estimates lose significance, as do
the estimates based on the Choice variable (Panel A). The estimates based
on the Number of Funds and the Fraction of Equity are, however, still
negative and significant.
Overall, these findings again support a ‘learning effect’. In other words,
exposure to decision-making about risky choices educates people. Those
who otherwise would not have made risky decisions are thereby induced to
participate in the stock market.

A Counterfactual Test
Next we perform a counterfactual experiment to test whether our main
explanatory variables—Choice, Number of Funds, and Equity—might
proxy for some individual-specific characteristics that are not necessarily
related to the introduction of the PPM system. That is, it might be that
people who make a deliberate selection of pension assets, or people that
invest most of their contributions in equity are also the ones who would in
any case participate more in the stock market, regardless of whether PPM
is in force.
To address this issue, we re-estimate the same model as before, but now
over a different period. Specifically, we select a time prior to the introduction of the PPM, so entry and exit decisions now refer to December
1999–June 2000. The goal is to use the same model as before. We hypothesize that if the decision to participate in the stock market is related to
the introduction of the new pension scheme, as opposed to individualspecific characteristics, we would anticipate that the very same variables
which explain stock market participation later on would also explain it
beforehand. Results in Table 12-8 support our hypothesis. That is, we find
no relationship between our main explanatory variables and the decision to
enter or exit the stock market. For the control variables, instead, the same
relationship holds. This suggests that it was the introduction of the new
Swedish retirement scheme that affected stock market behavior as opposed
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0.0201

0.252

p-val

Hansen
OIR Test

0.3612

0.0028

Est.

219.110 0.000 1.311

F-stat.

F-test of
instruments

0.0916 (0.36)
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Notes: All controls from Table 12-2 and an intercept are also included in the model.

Source: Authors’ calculations.

1 if the person held equity in our sample in December 1998 or June 1999; t-statistics are reported in parentheses.

the instruments. For 2SLS linear probability model, we report Hansen over identifying restrictions test. For IV-probit estimates, we report Wald test of exogeneity. Past Participation Dummy is defined as equal to

period from December 1999 to June 2000 (prior to PPM introduction). We used as instruments Age and squared Age of the investor. We report the results of first stage estimate and joint F -test of significance of

This table reports the result of 2SLS linear probability model and IV-Probit estimates of a decision to enter (Panel A) and exit the stock market as a function of PPM choice. The entry and exit referred to the
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to participants’ characteristics. The findings also provide strong evidence
of causality from PPM choice to subsequent investment behaviors.

Discussion and Conclusion
This chapter has focused on how the introduction of a DC retirement system affects investors’ propensity to participate directly in the stock market.
Our unique evidence on investor patterns before and after the Swedish
PPM was introduced permits us to focus on the decision to invest in stocks.
Results show how this pattern changes, once investors were permitted
to participate in the new pension system. Specifically, we showed that
introducing the chance to invest in retirement funds increased peoples’
tendency to enter the stock market. We also show that investors who made
a deliberate choice of their pension asset allocation also boosted stock
market participation once the plan was in place. Investors who previously
did not participate in the stock market turn out to have a higher likelihood
of entering once they are presented with the new pension scheme.
What this means, we argue, is that requiring workers to invest in mutual
funds can act as a triggering device which induces them to enter the
stock market as well; being induced to choose among different pension
funds appears to ‘educate’ participants about the stock market. The fact
that investors do not treat their retirement account investments as close
substitutes for direct equity investment also implies that the adoption
of a capitalization-based system does not necessarily crowd out direct
investment. This may be of interest to policymakers in the current debate
about moving from a pay-as-you-go to a fully funded DC system.
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Notes
1

For the year 2006, one income base amount equals 44,500 SEK.
For example, for a person with 360,000 SEK as her pension-based income in
the year 2006, only 18.5% of 333,750 SEK (7.5 × 44,500) will count toward her
pension. In other words, her defined contribution to PPM in 2006 is 8,344 SEK
(0.025 × 333,750), which is the maximum contribution per individual for that year.
The typical exchange rate in 2000 was 10 SEK for US$1 and for 2006 around
7 SEK/USD.
2
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3
The slightly higher average for active investors is consistent with Engström and
Westerberg (2003) who show that active investors tend to have slightly higher
income than the ‘default’ investors.
4
Net wealth is made up of the market value of domestic and international financial
assets such as bank account, fixed income, mutual funds, stocks and options, and
an estimated market value of real estate, minus debt.
5
The table also shows that the average age of our sample is 43; 89% were born in
Sweden; average gross income in 2000 was 202,269 SEK, and average net wealth was
444,108 SEK. Some 29% lived in the countryside, with the remaining 71% living in
either one of the three major cities in Sweden (35%) or in a town (36%). Few, 18%,
had not completed high school; 51% had completed high school; and 31% went to
college. Around one-quarter majored in social science (including economics, law,
sociology and so on); another quarter had an engineering major; 13% majored in
medicine; and 36% had unspecified majors. Public sector employees made up 29%
of the sample, while 56% were in the private sector and only 5% were self-employed.
Most (78%) were married and 51% were male. After matching all the different
sources, 154 observations were deleted due to missing demographic information.
6
Specifically, we control on investors’ Age in 2000; Swedish nationality; Net Income
(in 2000 measured as the logarithm of income in SEK plus 1); Net Wealth defined as
the market value of financial wealth and real estate less the value of debt (measured
as the logarithm of Net Wealth plus 1); Urban, which takes the value of 1 if the
investor lived in one of the three major cities in Sweden; Town takes the value of
1 if the investor lived in a smaller town; and Rural equals 1 if the investor lived in
the countyside. We also include three variables which measure educational levels,
respectively set to 1 if the person’s schooling was less than, equal to, or exceeded
high school. We control for participants’ education major by using four variables
which take on a value of 1 if the investor’s higher education major was social
science, engineering, medical school, or other respectively. Analogously, we control
for occupational differences using four variables set to 1, respectively, if the person
was employed in the public sector, private sector, self employed, or had unknown
employment or was unemployed. Finally, we include Male and Married controls,
respectively set to 1 if the investor were a male and 1 if the investor was married. To
achieve identification, in Tables 12-3 and 12-4, we used Age, Age Squared, and set
of dummies related to education major in selection equation and not in the second
stage.
7
It is interesting that, for most of our estimates, the correlation coefficients of the
Probit and selection equation error terms are not statistically significant (i.e. in our
case, selection does not affect the Probit results). This allows us to ignore the issues
of selectivity and to concentrate on the issues related to the endogeneity of the
choice.
8
It is worth noticing that the tests of the goodness of instruments show indeed
that our instruments do a good job. We report the first-stage estimates and a
joint F -test of significance of the instruments; they are jointly significant at the
first stage. For the 2SLS linear probability model, we report Hansen over identifying restrictions test. For IV-probit estimates we report Wald test of exogeneity. For 2SLS estimates, the test of over identified restrictions fails to reject the
model.
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